

were traveling. Of the 25 women evaluated, 13 passed "Phase I," as this initial set of medical/psychological tests were called. Up to this point, this effort had been orchestrated by Dr. Lovelace along with Jackie Cochrane's advice and money.

The next step in testing for the rest of the women was to be carried out at the Naval School of Aviation Medicine. Dr. Lovelace, through his significant connections in NASA and the federal government, worked diligently to get this to be an officially sanctioned activity of NASA, but was unsuccessful. A few days before they were to report to Pensacola, they each received a telegram informing them that the testing was canceled. While all these women were devastated by this sudden cancellation, some had given up jobs and other possible futures to pursue this dream. There never was any training involved; all of the activities involved medical screening.

Jerrie Cobb and Janey Hart subsequently charged Capitol Hill to fight for a continuation of this effort and to make it an official NASA program. On 17 and 18 July 1962, Representative Victor Anfuso (R) convened hearings of the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics.³ While Miss Cobb and Mrs. Hart argued for a continuation of the program, ironically Jackie Cochran testified against continuation. She testified that she had come to be concerned that a special program to train female astronauts could hurt the space program, i.e., slow down the effort to put an American on the Moon first. You might note that at the time of these hearings the United States had been beaten into space by the Russians and now the emphasis was getting to the Moon first.

NASA also had representatives at these hearing. George Low, Director of Spacecraft and Flight Missions, testified that astronaut applicants must meet the following requirements: be a U.S. citizen under 35 yr of age; have a height 6 ft or less and

excellent physical condition; one degree in physical or biological sciences or in engineering; and must have experience as a jet test pilot having attained experimental flight test status through the military services, the aircraft industry, or NASA, or having graduated from a military test pilot school. Preference was given to those who were engaged in flying high-performance aircraft. Applicants also needed to be recommended by their present organization.

The sticking point was the experience requirement. As accomplished as the Mercury 13 were, women were not permitted to become military jet test pilots and thus they were barred from becoming astronauts.

Although the congressional hearing did not find evidence of discrimination, it would seem that in the early 1960s the United States was not ready for women to move from the kitchen to the controls of a space vehicle (author's opinion). This was despite the tremendous contributions many brave and talented women had already made to aviation. In 1963 the Soviets sent Valentina Tereshkova into space. It was not until 1978 that NASA finally selected female astronauts and, in 1983, the United States finally flew a woman (Sally Ride) into space.

REFERENCES

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2. Nolen S. *Promised the Moon: the untold story of the first women in the space race*. Toronto (Canada): Penguin Canada; 2002.
3. *Qualifications for Astronauts*. Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on the Selection of Astronauts, U.S. House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 2nd session (1962).

Erratum

Paskoff L. *Development of a geographic information system for risk-informed decision making in aerospace medicine*. *Aerosp Med Hum Perform*. 2016; 87(11):972–975.

In the Science and Technology Watch article noted above, an author was inadvertently omitted. Please add Paul Rogers, Ph.D., as the second author. We apologize for any inconvenience this has caused.

The new citation should read:

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